Logon Sessions and Access Tokens
What LSASS creates at the end of every logon: the logon session, identified by a LUID, and the access tokens that reference it. Their contents (SIDs, group attributes, privileges, integrity level), the UAC split token, the well-known and virtual-account sessions found on every system, and how defenders use logon IDs to correlate telemetry.
Introduction
The LSASS article ended with the last step of a successful logon: LSASS creates a logon session and an access token. These two objects are the link between authentication and authorization. Authentication packages such as NTLM and Kerberos answer the question who is this?. From then on, every access check made by the Security Reference Monitor in the kernel answers the question what may this process do? using only the token.1
This article describes both objects, how they relate to each other, how User Account Control (UAC) splits them, and how they appear in the telemetry a defender collects.
Logon sessions
When they are created
A logon session is created every time a security principal logs on,
interactively or not. A user at the console, an RDP connection, a service
starting under its account, a scheduled task, and a network connection to a
file share each produce one. The session is created by LSASS when
LsaLogonUser succeeds, and it lasts until the last token that references it
is closed.2
A logon session holds the identity established by the authentication:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Logon ID | A locally unique identifier (LUID), unique on the system until the next reboot |
| User name and SID | The authenticated principal |
| Groups | The group SIDs resolved at logon |
| Logon type | How the logon happened: interactive, network, service and so on |
| Authentication package | The package that validated it: Negotiate, Kerberos, NTLM, CloudAP |
| Logon time, logon server | When, and against which authority |
| Session | The terminal (Remote Desktop) session the logon belongs to |
The authentication packages also attach their credential material to the logon session, which is what enables single sign-on for the processes running in it.3
Logon session is not terminal session. The Session column of tools such as Process Explorer is the terminal session (session 0 for services, 1 and above for interactive desktops). A single terminal session contains many logon sessions: the user’s, those of Desktop Window Manager and font driver host, and those created by every runas or network logon.
Logon types
| Type | Name | Example |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Interactive | Console logon |
| 3 | Network | Access to a file share or another network resource |
| 4 | Batch | Scheduled task |
| 5 | Service | Service started under an account |
| 7 | Unlock | Workstation unlock |
| 8 | NetworkCleartext | Network logon with the password sent to the server, for example IIS basic authentication |
| 9 | NewCredentials | runas /netonly: local identity unchanged, new credentials for outbound connections |
| 10 | RemoteInteractive | Remote Desktop |
| 11 | CachedInteractive | Interactive logon with cached domain credentials, no DC reachable |
The logon type is recorded in every logon event.4
Many sessions on a single system
It is normal for a system to host dozens of logon sessions. Some of them have well-known LUIDs and exist from boot:5
| LUID | Account | SID |
|---|---|---|
0x3E7 |
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (shown as the computer account, e.g. WORKGROUP\HOST$) |
S-1-5-18 |
0x3E4 |
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE (network identity: the computer account) |
S-1-5-20 |
0x3E5 |
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE |
S-1-5-19 |
0x3E6 |
Anonymous logon | S-1-5-7 |
Others belong to virtual accounts, which the system creates on demand for specific components:6
| Account | SID prefix | Created for |
|---|---|---|
Window Manager\DWM-n |
S-1-5-90-0 |
The Desktop Window Manager of terminal session n |
Font Driver Host\UMFD-n |
S-1-5-96-0 |
The user-mode font driver host of terminal session n |
NT VIRTUAL MACHINE\{VM GUID} |
S-1-5-83-1 |
Each Hyper-V virtual machine worker process |
NT SERVICE\name |
S-1-5-80 |
Services running with a service SID or as a virtual account |
An interactive user with administrative rights typically appears twice, with two different LUIDs and the same SID. The reason is UAC, described below.
Access tokens
Tokens and logon sessions
An access token is a kernel object that describes the security context of
a process or a thread. Every token records the LUID of the logon session it
belongs to (the AuthenticationId), and a single logon session is usually
referenced by many tokens (Figure 1).1 When the user’s
shell starts a program, the new process receives a copy of the parent’s
primary token, and so every process the user runs points back to the same
logon session.
flowchart TB
subgraph LS["Logon session"]
direction LR
LID["Logon ID (LUID)"]
USR["User name"]
SID["SID"]
GRP["Groups"]
end
LS --> T1["Token: explorer.exe<br/>privileges"]
LS --> T2["Token: notepad.exe<br/>privileges"]
LS --> T3["Token: browser<br/>privileges"]
LS --> T4["Impersonation token<br/>of a server thread"]
Figure 1. One logon session referenced by several access tokens.
Tokens come in two kinds:
- A primary token is attached to a process and defines its security context.
- An impersonation token is attached to a thread, typically in a server, so that it can act on behalf of a client. Its impersonation level (Anonymous, Identification, Impersonation, Delegation) limits what the server can do with the client’s identity.7
Token contents
The most relevant fields of a token are:1
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| User | The SID of the user |
| Groups | Group SIDs, each with attributes (see below) |
| Privileges | System-wide rights, each enabled or disabled |
| Integrity level | A mandatory label: Low, Medium, High or System |
| Owner, primary group, default DACL | Defaults applied to objects the process creates |
| AuthenticationId | The LUID of the logon session |
| Session ID | The terminal session |
| Type, impersonation level | Primary or impersonation token |
| Elevation type, linked token | UAC information |
Group attributes control how a SID takes part in access checks:
| Attribute | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Mandatory | Always enabled, cannot be disabled |
| Enabled / Enabled by default | Considered when granting access |
| Deny only | Considered only to deny access, never to grant it |
| Logon ID | The logon SID (S-1-5-5-X-Y), unique to the logon session |
| Integrity | The SID is the mandatory integrity label of the token |
Privileges are separate from object permissions. They authorize
system-wide operations such as shutting down the system
(SeShutdownPrivilege), debugging any process (SeDebugPrivilege) or
impersonating a client (SeImpersonatePrivilege). A privilege can be present
in a token but disabled: the process must enable it explicitly before it
takes effect. A privilege that is absent cannot be enabled.8
Experiment: reading the token of a process
The Security tab of Process Explorer shows the token of any process: user and SID, terminal session, logon session LUID, groups with their flags, and privileges.9 For a standard
explorer.exeof an administrator it shows, among others:
BUILTIN\Administratorswith the flag Deny;Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Levelwith the flag Integrity;- a short list of privileges, only
SeChangeNotifyPrivilegeenabled by default.The same information for the current process is available from the command line:10
1 2 whoami /all # user, groups with attributes, privileges whoami /logonid # logon SID of the current logon sessionAll logon sessions on the system, with their logon type and authentication package, can be listed with
klist sessionsor with the Sysinternals LogonSessions tool (run elevated):11
1 2 klist sessions logonsessions.exe -p # also lists the processes in each session
UAC and the split token
When a member of the Administrators group logs on interactively with UAC enabled, LSASS creates two logon sessions and two tokens, linked to each other (Figure 2).12
flowchart TB
L["Interactive logon of an administrator"] --> F
L --> E
subgraph F["Logon session A: filtered token"]
direction TB
F1["Administrators: deny only"]
F2["Medium integrity"]
F3["Reduced privileges"]
end
subgraph E["Logon session B: elevated token"]
direction TB
E1["Administrators: enabled"]
E2["High integrity"]
E3["Full privileges"]
end
F <-.->|"linked token"| E
F --> X["explorer.exe and the processes it starts"]
E --> Y["Processes started after a consent prompt"]
Figure 2. The UAC split token: two linked logon sessions for one logon.
- The filtered token is used for the user’s shell and for every process started normally. The Administrators SID is present but marked deny only, the administrative privileges are removed and the integrity level is Medium.
- The elevated token has the Administrators group enabled, the full set of privileges and High integrity. It is used only when the user approves an elevation prompt; the elevated process therefore runs in a different logon session from its non-elevated parent.
This explains the two entries with the same user and SID in a list of logon
sessions. The filtered and elevated tokens are retrievable from each other
through the TokenLinkedToken information class, and their status is exposed
as the elevation type (Default, Limited, Full).13
The integrity level adds a mandatory check on top of the DACL: a process cannot obtain write access to an object with a higher integrity label, and cannot open processes of a higher integrity level with most access rights. This is what isolates a Medium process from the elevated processes of the same user.14
Telemetry
The logon ID is the key that ties together the security events of a logon, from authentication to the processes it runs.
| Event | Logged when | Fields of interest |
|---|---|---|
46244 |
A logon session is created | Logon ID, Linked Logon ID, Logon Type, Elevated Token, Authentication Package, Impersonation Level, Virtual Account, source address |
467215 |
A new logon received sensitive privileges | Logon ID, list of privileges; marks administrative logons |
468816 |
A process is created | Logon ID of the subject, Token Elevation Type, Mandatory Label |
4634 / 464717 |
A logon session ends / a user initiated logoff | Logon ID, Logon Type |
Sysmon 118 |
A process is created | LogonId, LogonGuid, IntegrityLevel, parent process |
Analytics worth building:
- Logon-to-process correlation. Join
4624and4688(or Sysmon1) on the logon ID to attribute every process to the logon, the source address and the authentication package that produced it. - Sensitive privileges.
4672for accounts that are not expected to be administrators, or administrative logons of type 3 or 10 from unusual sources. - Unexpected token context. A process whose logon ID, user or integrity
level differs from its parent’s without a corresponding elevation or
runasis a sign of token manipulation, catalogued by MITRE ATT&CK as T1134.19 - Logon type 9.
NewCredentialslogons are rare in normal administration and keep alternate credentials in the logon session; they deserve review.
Hardening
| Control | Effect |
|---|---|
| Least privilege | Users and services hold only the group memberships and privileges they need |
| UAC in Admin Approval Mode | Administrators run with a filtered token by default; elevation is explicit and logged12 |
| User Rights Assignment review | Restrict sensitive privileges such as SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege and SeBackupPrivilege to the accounts that require them20 |
| Virtual accounts and service SIDs | Run services under dedicated, low-privilege identities instead of SYSTEM or shared accounts |
| End idle sessions | Disconnected but not logged-off RDP sessions keep their logon session and its credential material in LSASS |
| Protected Users | Members’ logon sessions keep no reusable NTLM credentials and have short-lived Kerberos tickets21 |
Summary
Every logon handled by LSASS produces a logon session, identified by a
LUID and carrying the user’s identity, logon type, authentication package
and credential material. Access tokens reference the logon session and
describe the security context of processes and threads: user and group SIDs
with their attributes, privileges, integrity level and UAC information. One
logon session is referenced by many tokens, and a system normally hosts many
logon sessions: the well-known SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE and NETWORK SERVICE
sessions, virtual accounts for DWM, font drivers, services and virtual
machines, and the users’ own. For administrators, UAC creates two linked
logon sessions: a filtered, Medium-integrity token for everyday work and an
elevated, High-integrity token used only after consent. For defenders, the
logon ID is the thread that links 4624, 4672, 4688 and Sysmon events
into a single, attributable story.
References
-
Microsoft Learn, Access Tokens. ↩︎ ↩︎2 ↩︎3
-
Microsoft Learn, LSA Logon Sessions. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, Credentials Processes in Windows Authentication. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, 4624(S): An account was successfully logged on. ↩︎ ↩︎2
-
Microsoft Learn, TOKEN_STATISTICS structure (winnt.h). ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, Security identifiers. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, Impersonation Levels. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, Privileges. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, Process Explorer. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, LogonSessions. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, How User Account Control works. ↩︎ ↩︎2
-
Microsoft Learn, TOKEN_ELEVATION_TYPE enumeration (winnt.h). ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, Mandatory Integrity Control. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, 4672(S): Special privileges assigned to new logon. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, 4688(S): A new process has been created. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, 4634(S): An account was logged off. ↩︎
-
MITRE ATT&CK, Access Token Manipulation (T1134). ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, User Rights Assignment. ↩︎
-
Microsoft Learn, Protected Users security group. ↩︎